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Radicalism(s) and Social Resilience

Radicalités et résiliences sociales

الشباب على محكّ تجربة اللاّيقين

Youth Confronted with Uncertainty

les jeunes à l’épreuve des incertitudes

الأصوليات والصمود الاجتماعي

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Published on Tuesday, May 20, 2025

Abstract

L’objectif de ce séminaire international est de stimuler la réflexion interdisciplinaire autour de la question des radicalités des jeunes, dans ses différentes formes et à travers des approches aussi diverses que possible. C’est aussi une invitation à dépasser la dichotomie entre l’approche macrosociologique centrée sur le « pourquoi » et l’approche microsociologique subjective et processuelle séduite par « le comment ». Dépassement à même, estimons-nous, d’appréhender la question des radicalités dans sa complexité mêlant l’histoire de l’individu, de l’institution et du contexte. A cet égard, il importe de comprendre les sens, que donnent les jeunes à leurs engagements dans chacune des causes ou des pensées radicales, sens qui ne cessent de gagner en visibilité partout dans le monde (montée du néonazisme, de l’extrême droite, des mouvements régionalistes, etc.).

Announcement

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Argument

“Radicalization,” “radicalism(s),” “radical commitment,” “radicalized youth,” “radicalized identities”: since 2011, these expressions—frequent in media content—have concerned politicians and attracted the attention of scholars. The deep upheavals caused by the uprisings in Arab societies (Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq) are part of the explanation. As the presence of “Salafist,” “jihadist,” and even “terrorist” groups extended beyond national borders in the Arab world, and their attacks spread globally, the phenomenon took on an international dimension—even involving young people of European nationalities who converted to Islam and went so far as to travel to Syria and Iraq to join Daesh.

In this sense, the terms “salafists,” “jihadists,” and “terrorists” are almost systematically used to refer to an ideological religious—specifically Islamic—commitment. Yet, the use of the concept of radicalization is far from unanimous: for years, it has been the subject of debate between two main schools of thought in academic circles. One posits the radicalization of Islam, asserting a clear and decisive connection between radical Islam and violent action (Gilles Kepel, 2015). The other, emphasizing the Islamization of radicalism, disputes this link between young people's radical engagement and Islamic doctrine, arguing that religious aspects are secondary (Olivier Roy, 2015, 2017), but often exaggerated due to a context that “over-spotlights” the figure of the young jihadist terrorists.

These controversial debates have undoubtedly stimulated sociological research and led specialists in youth radicalization to revisit and broaden the definitions of the concept, adopting a pluralistic perspective that goes beyond reductive interpretations. As a result, the meaning of “radicalization”—once closely tied to Islamist ideology—has gradually shifted toward a broader and more multifaceted understanding. For example, Olivier Galland and Anne Muxel define radicalism as “a set of attitudes or actions that express a desire to break with the political, social, and cultural system, and more broadly, with the prevailing norms and values of society” (Galland & Muxel, 2018, p.9). There are thus as many forms of radicalization that challenge the political, economic, or social order as there are profiles of radicalized youth. Besides, as the category of “youth” is far from homogeneous in terms of values, lifestyles, forms of action, and perspectives, sociologists emphasize that the category of religiously radicalized youth is even less so—on the contrary, it is richly diverse: including behavioral and cognitive radicalism(s) (Xavier Crettiez, 2016); agonistic, rebellious yet soothing, or utopian radicalism(s) (Laurent Bonelli and Fabien Carrié, 2018); in addition to Islamist, indigenist, and nationalist forms (Manuel Boucher, ed., 2020).

In a broader understanding of radicalization, Anne Muxel and Olivier Galland (2018) distinguish four forms of radicalism: religious, far-left political, far-right political, and transgressive radicalism without political underpinnings. Michel Fize, for one, highlights two dominant forms of radicalism in French society that appeal to young people: extremist political radicalism of the National Front type, and Islamist political-religious radicalism. This sociologist refers to the first as “protest radicalism”—it reflects an attitude of opposition to a political system that these youth perceive as “rotten,” and to an economic system that excludes them. The second form, that of jihadist youth, is more of an “offensive” radicalism—driven by the pursuit of an alternative world guided by the righteous precepts of Islam, and rejecting what they see as the corrupting influences of Western culture, such as leisure, parties, alcohol, and so on (Michel Fize, 2017).

The aim of this international conference is to stimulate interdisciplinary reflection on this issue, in all its various forms and through as diverse a range of approaches as possible. It is also an invitation to move beyond the dichotomy between the macrosociological approach, focused on the “why,” and the subjective, processual microsociological approach, concerned with the “how.” This shift, we believe, enables a more comprehensive understanding of radicalism(s) in all their complexity—considering individual histories, institutional dynamics, and contextual drivers. In this respect, it is crucial to understand the meanings that young people assign to their involvement in different radical causes or ideologies—meanings that are becoming increasingly visible worldwide (e.g., the rise of neo-Nazism, far-right movements, regionalist movements, etc.).

Viewed from this perspective, youth are far from being approached merely as vulnerable to radicalization and/or recruitment by radical groups. Instead, they are seen as active agents, bearing potential for resilience and as full-fledged subjects capable of discernment and equipped with community inclusion skills—all of them constitute arguments in support of preventive action against various forms of radicalism. This is evidenced by the commitment shown by certain young people in civil society, through cultural practices witnessed in sensibilization campaigns, sporting activities, and cultural cafés—several alternatives to violent radicalism that can awaken and strengthen the resistance capacities of their more vulnerable peers who may be susceptible to radical temptation. This underscores how our concern in this conference is essentially focused on identifying and capitalizing on the “potentials” that young people possess—potentials that can play a key role in the prevention of radicalization.

More explicitly, we seek to understand how youth engagement in various forms of radicalism constitutes an alternative offer of identity. Likewise, how can the role played by socialization institutions such as schools and families help prevent radicalism(s)? How do these radicalism(s) take on a transnational form that transcends local and national spaces and territories? How does the context of political, ideological, democratic, or economic crisis shape the thinking of younger generations who reject, protest, and stand against the established order by inventing new forms of commitment, practices, communities, ideas, values, and more? Without claiming to be exhaustive, our initiative seeks to stimulate reflection on the question of radicalisms and proposes, indicatively but not restrictively, the following research axes:

1- Family, School, and Radicalism(s)

The thematic focus of this exis of inquiry gives attention to the relationship between various forms of radicalism and key educational and socialization institutions, namely the family and the school. In the current context, marked by the decline of institutions (François Dubet, 2002), these entities seem to lack the inspiration needed to meet the expectations of younger generations and support their future aspirations. Indeed, numerous studies have shown that the school system often leans in a counterproductive direction—fostering the development of radical values and identities that may incite highly violent behaviors.

The same can be said of the family, where rising forms of radicalism can be observed among radicalized youth, often caused by the breakdown of intergenerational transmission (Selma Belaala, 2008), and testifying to the opposition to parental authority. The adoption of a rebellious radical identity reflects, on the one hand, a conflictual relationship with less protective and less supervising parents; on the other hand, it is shaped by forms of sociability that emerge in peer groups or gangs influenced by unusual religious discourses (Laurent Bonelli and Fabien Carrié, 2018). The existence of a family environment marked by violence and conflict pushes teenagers—who are searching for “warmth” and “comfort” that they do not find within their families—towards the path of radicalization (Marwan Mohamed, 2011). In this way, youth radicalism appears to be a recoding of traditional forms of opposition among young people to the family institution (Bonelli & Carrié, 2018).

As for the school, it no longer fulfills—at least in the eyes of young people—its role as a channel for social mobility. The high unemployment rates among the so-called “State nobility” (Pierre Bourdieu, 1989) bear witness to this failure, both in so-called developing countries and even in certain developed nations. Unable to ensure the professional integration of school pupils, especially those from working-class neighborhoods and/or immigrant families, how can the school culturally integrate them? How can it effectively convey and instill values such as tolerance, secularism, and human rights?

Paradoxically, the school often contributes to the reproduction of social inequalities and to the feelings of contempt experienced by high school students from these backgrounds. This helps explain why the relationship with school is increasingly conflictual (evident in rising violence, school dropout, academic dishonesty), and consequently, why the relationship with authorities—who are supposed to promote and uphold societal norms and values—is becoming ever more strained ?

2-Cultures, Sports Practices, and Risky Behaviors: Radicalisms and Resilience Potentials

From another perspective, certain forms of radicalism among young people can also reflect a quest for independence—and for self-assurance—vis-à-vis others, often expressed through opposition to the dominant value system. In experimenting with their status as subjects, by testing social taboos and trying to find a place for themselves within an adult-centric and exclusionary world (David Le Breton, 2002), they seek to attain what is otherwise denied to them. Unconventional cultural practices—such as street art (graffiti, street theatre, dance performances, etc.)—are perceived as countercultural expressions of outsider artists (Christophe Genin, 2022). These forms of public space appropriation, often used to convey political, social, or personal messages, are nonetheless frequently misunderstood or subjected to harsh judgment, being labeled as radical when presented in conventional exhibition spaces.

The realm of sports is no exception: in Tunisia, certain sports practices may arguably carry the stigma of radicalism, such as the violent actions of “ultra” groups observed in football matches. Other radicalized practices include extreme sports, self-harm, suicide attempts, public self-immolation, addiction, etc.—all of which “involve risky personal engagement” (David Le Breton, 2013). Risky behaviors can thus be seen as “forms of personal meaning-making and sacralization [...], a paradoxical attempt to regain control over one’s life, to finally make decisions for oneself” (David Le Breton, 2016, p. 166).

In this sense, cultural and sports practices turn out to be forms of resistance and resilience—as though to escape or prevent involvement in radicalization. Inquiries, therefore, have much to gain from focusing on individual trajectories and the subjective experiences of young people involved in unconventional cultural activities or risky sports practices. Furthermore, it is important to investigate how institutional and associative actors manage to prevent youth involvement in these radical forms and promote cultural practices with high resilience potential.

3-Crisis of Democracy, Crisis of Human Rights, and Radicalism(s)

It is quite striking that representative democracy has, for several decades now, been going through a profound crisis and is increasingly failing to appeal to young people. In fact, even societies with longstanding democratic traditions are not immune to the radicalization of their youth, who are continually drawn to new forms of political expression and engagement (Sylvie Ollitrault et al., 2012). We observe a clear shift among young people away from conventional modes of political participation, accompanied by the rise of two distinct forms of radicalism: protest radicalism and rupture radicalism. The former reflects an embrace of a value system rooted in cultural liberalism, while the latter is more closely associated with illiberal and authoritarian attitudes (Anne Muxel, 2018).

The rise of political radicalism among youth is a response to a deeply altered context: the crisis of political parties and partisan identification, the blurring of the left-right divide, the global surge in political populism, increasing electoral abstention rates, the expansion of a radicalized protest culture, and the erosion of universal values and human rights. Especially relevant—and worth emphasizing—is the genocide currently perpetrated in Gaza under intense media scrutiny. Can we turn a blind eye to the suffering of the Palestinian people, who have lived for nearly a century under apartheid, while still claiming to uphold universal values that are, inter alia, undermined by the double standards adopted by those—mainly Western states—which only raise the banner of human rights when it aligns with their national interests?

This axis of inquiry invites reflection on the crisis of representative democracy and the normative shifts that point to the regression of universal values. It also seeks to explore the links between these shifts and the emergence of many forms of radicalism among young people.

4-Mobility, Migration, and Radicalism

At first glance, the connection between migration—or mobility in general—and radicalism may seem surprising. Migration has brought, and continues to bring, prosperity to millions of individuals who have left their countries of origin, as well as to employers in host countries, particularly during critical periods of labor shortages. More recently, in alignment with the new spirit of globalized capitalism (Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, 1999), the pace of flows between nations has reached an unprecedented rate in history.

Yet, despite the global economic system’s growing demand for the exchange of goods, ideas, and skills, we still witness widespread propagation of xenophobic and even overtly racist discourse, more intense than ever before, through social media, public spaces, and even political and media platforms. Radicalized ideologies targeting foreigners, migrants, and those with different cultures or religions circulate among the populations of many countries. Often invoking the Nation and sovereignty, sometimes under the grip of demographic fears, these voices demand the expulsion of ‘foreigners’. Does this mean globalization is betraying itself and that ‘nationalisms’ are retreating into seclusion? The facts suggest otherwise: human mobility—even when fraught with risk—continues unabated, and relationships of labor, marriage, intercultural exchange, and, above all, solidarity between individuals of different nationalities endure. Against xenophobia stands a ‘global civil society’ (Ulrich Beck, 1985), weaving transnational networks in defense of the rights of future generations to sustainable development, the right of global citizens to a healthy, unpolluted environment, the rights of minorities to enjoy their distinctiveness, and above all, the right to move freely.

Associative activism, artistic performances, and public demonstrations held in ‘national’ spaces and shared across the physical and digital world, encompass a strong potential for resilience that stands in opposition to xenophobic radicalism.

Submission Guidelines

Proposals for papers, between 3,000 and 4,000 characters, should be sent to the following email address: ecumus2013@yahoo.com


Deadline: July 15, 2025 – 12:00 AM


Notification to authors: July 31, 2025

Each proposal must include:

  • A title
  • Full name(s)
  • Institutional affiliation

Conference : 16-18th October 2025

Scientific Coordination

  • Dr. Samiha HAMDI, University of Sfax

Scientific Committee

  • Prof. Fathi REKIK, University of Sfax
  • Prof. Zouheir Ben JANNET, University of Sfax
  • Prof. Sadok DAMAK ? University of Sfax
  • Prof. Moncef MEHWACHI, University of Sfax
  • Prof. Chokri MEMNI, University of Sfax
  • Prof. Mouldi GASSOUMI, University ofTunis
  • Prof. Imed MILLITI, University ofTunis El-Manar
  • Prof. Sylvie MAZELLA, University of Aix Marseille
  • Prof. Hasan BOUBAKRI, Professeur émirite, University of Sousse
  • Prof. Marc BREVIGLIERI, HETS Geneva
  • Prof. Omor ZAAFOURI, University of Sfax
  • Prof. Hafedh BEN AMOR, University of Gabes
  • Prof. Chiraz LAATIRI, University of La Manouba
  • Prof. Sihem NAJJAR, University of La Manouba
  • Prof. Monia LACHEB, University of La Manouba
  • Prof. Samira WALHEZI, University of Jendouba
  • Prof. Adel BENELHAJ RHOUMA, University of Tunis
  • Prof. Mongi HAMED, University of Gafsa

Organizing Committee

  • Dr. Mouna KHECHAREM
  • Dr. Hanen CHEBBI
  • Dr. Tasnim HAMDI
  • Dr. Oussama BOUYAHYA
  • Dr. Imen BDOUR
  • Olfa HAMDI
  • Chokri TORCH
  • Amel BEN MASSOUD

Bibliographical References

Belaala Selma, « Les facteurs de création ou de modification des processus de radicalisation violente, chez les jeunes en particulier », Compagnie Européenne d’Intelligence Stratégique (CEIS), 2008.

Beck Ulrich, Pouvoir et contre-pouvoir à l’ère de la mondialisation, Paris, Flammarion, Alto/Aubier 2003.

Boltanski Luc et Chiapello Eve, Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme. Paris, Gallimard (Nrf Essais), 1999.

Bourdieu Pierre, La Noblesse d’Etat. Grandes Écoles et esprit de corps, Paris, Minuit, 1989.

Laurent Bonelli et Fabien Carrié, La Fabrique de la radicalité. Une sociologie des jeunes djihadistes français, Paris, Seuil, 2018.

Crettiez Xavier, « Penser la radicalisation Une sociologie processuelle des variables de l’engagement violent », Revue française de science politique 66(5), 2016, pp. 709-727.

Dubet François, Le déclin de l’institution, Paris, Seuil, coll. L’épreuve des faits, 2002.

Fize Michel, Radicalisation de la Jeunesse : Le monde des extrêmes, Éditions Eyrolles, 2016.

Galland Olivier et Muxel Anne (s. dir.), La tentation radicale. Enquête auprès des lycéens, Paris, PUF, 2018.

Genin Christophe, « Le street art : le débordement autonome », Nouvelle revue d’esthétique  n° 29/1, 2022, pp. 29-38.

Kepel Gilles, Fitna, Paris, Gallimard, 2004.

Kepel Gilles, Du Jihad à la Fitna, Paris, Bayard, 2005.

Kepel Gilles, La fracture, Paris, Gallimard / France Culture, 2016.

Le Breton David, « Les conduites à risque des jeunes », Agora débats/jeunesses, 27, 2002. Les jeunes et le risque, pp. 34-45. DOI : https://doi.org/10.3406/agora.2002.1995

Le Breton, David. « Passions physiques et sportives de l’ “extrême” », Conduites à risque, Paris, PUF, 2013. p.173-240.

Le Breton David, « Conduites à risque », dans Le Breton, David, Jeffrey, Denis, Lachance, Jocelyn (dir.), Penser l’adolescence. Approche socio-anthropologique. Paris : PUF, 2016, p. 163-175.

Mohamed Marwan, La formation des bandes. Entre la famille, l’école et la rue, Paris, PUF, 2011.

Muxel Anne, « Radicalité politique : entre protestation et rupture », dans Galland Olivier et Muxel, Anne, La tentation radicale. Enquête auprès des lycéens Enquête auprès des lycéens, Paris cedex 14, Presses Universitaires de France, Hors collection, 2018, pp.203-265.

Sylvie Ollitrault, Graeme Hayes et Pascale Dufour, « Radicalités et radicalisations-la fabrication d'une nouvelle "norme" politique », Lien social et Politiques n°68, 2012.

Rekik Fethi et Damak Sadok, « Influential actors, religiosity, and political power in Tunisia», in Juline Beaujouan et al (eds.), Vulnerability and Resilience to Violent Extremism: An Actor-Centric Approach. London and New York: Routledge, 2024, pp.124-41. 

Roy Olivier, Généalogie de l’islamisme, Paris, Pluriel, 2011.

Roy Olivier, Le djihad et la mort, Paris, Seuil, 2016a.

Roy Olivier, « Peut-on comprendre les motivations des djihadistes? », Pouvoirs n°158, 2016b. pp. 15-24. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3917/pouv.158.0015

Places

  • Route de l'aéroport km 4,5 - Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Sfax
    Sfax, Tunisia (3000)

Event attendance modalities

Full on-site event


Date(s)

  • Monday, June 30, 2025

Keywords

  • radicalité, jeune, résilience sociale

Contact(s)

  • Hamdi Samiha
    courriel : samiha [dot] hamdi [at] flshs [dot] usf [dot] tn

Information source

  • Samiha Hamdi
    courriel : samiha [dot] hamdi [at] flshs [dot] usf [dot] tn

License

CC0-1.0 This announcement is licensed under the terms of Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal.

To cite this announcement

« Radicalism(s) and Social Resilience », Call for papers, Calenda, Published on Tuesday, May 20, 2025, https://doi.org/10.58079/13ydi

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