L’objectif de ce colloque est de confronter les travaux en neurosciences et ceux de la philosophie informée par les neurosciences pour mieux comprendre les relations que la motivation humaine entretient avec les affects.

Cette conférence internationale pluridisciplinaire : neurosciences, psychologie, philosophie se tiendra les 15 et 16 mai sur le campus de Beaulieu de l'université de Rennes 1. Elle est organisée dans le cadre du projet Désir labellisé par la MSH Bretagne.

Argumentaire

L’idée selon laquelle le désir d’un côté et le plaisir et les émotions de l’autre sont profondément unis l’un à l’autre est aujourd’hui sous le feu de critiques multiples aussi bien de la part des philosophes que du point de vue des neurosciences. On pourrait citer en neurosciences les travaux de Berridge qui ont montré qu’on pouvait dissocier l’appréciation d’un stimulus de la motivation à rechercher ce stimulus. On pourrait aussi souligner le caractère distinct des neurotransmetteurs médiant la motivation de ceux régulant l’expérience du plaisir. On pourrait enfin pointer le phénomène de la dépendance qui maintient le désir de prise de drogue alors même que le plaisir n’est plus au rendez-vous.

En philosophie, la tentative de réduire le plaisir à une expérience dont on désirerait qu’elle se poursuive soulève plus de problème qu’elle n’en résout. On a aussi rejeté l’idée que les émotions ou la douleur pourraient être comprises en termes de désir. De même l’idée selon laquelle les désirs pourraient être guidés par la recherche du plaisir semble très largement battue en brèche. Après tout rien ne semble s’opposer à la construction d’un système qui poursuivrait des buts mais qui n’aurait ni émotion ni expérience de plaisir.

Toutes ces considérations montrent que la motivation et les affects (émotions et plaisirs/douleurs) ne sont pas réductibles l’un à l’autre. Mais reconnaître cette indépendance de nature ne doit pas nous faire négliger les liens multiples et complexes qui relient la motivation et les affects, et plus particulièrement en quel sens la motivation chez l’homme est accompagnée ou dépend plus ou moins directement des affects.

L’objectif de ce colloque est de confronter les travaux en neurosciences et ceux de la philosophie informée par les neurosciences pour mieux comprendre les relations que la motivation humaine entretient avec les affects.

On voudrait en particulier s’interroger sur les questions suivantes :

• Quelles sont les dépendances / indépendances de la motivation humaine par rapport aux affects ?
• Dans quelle mesure la motivation partage avec les affects des processus d’évaluation ?
• Existe-t-il une organisation temporelle entre affects et motivation ?
• Quel est le rapport entre expériences affectives, évaluation et récompense ?
• Quels sont les effets spécifiques des expériences subjectives d’affect sur la motivation ?
• Pourquoi l’évolution a-t-elle ajouté à notre système motivationnel une capacité à avoir des expériences émotionnelles et hédoniques ?

Programme

Jeudi 15 mai 2014

Accueil à partir de 9h30 : café et croissants

10h > 11h

• Mathias Pessiglione, Inserm, ICM - Institut du cerveau et de la moelle épinière

The neural code of subjective value

Abstract: The “neuro-economics” research program postulates that subjective values underpinning choice behavior can be identified in neural signals. In this talk, I will first provide evidence that subjective values are indeed reflected in a dedicated brain system, with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex as a key component. Then I will highlight some properties of this “brain valuation system” (BVS) that complicate the decoding of subjective values but explain some deviations from rational behavior, such as preference instability. Finally, I will intend to cast light on two questions: 1) whether BVS activity is associated to emotional feelings, 2) whether the BVS signals both anticipated and experiences rewards (desire and pleasure).

11h15 > 12h

• Agnes Moors, Ghent University

Dissociations registered in different behavioral channels may point at conflicting wantings and their corresponding likings rather than at liking without wanting and wanting without liking.

Abstract: The concepts of liking and wanting refer to two (or better four) phases in a typical action control loops (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2002). In such a loop, wanting and liking go together: we like what we want and we want what we like. Two questions arise: (1) Can wanting and liking become decoupled? (2) Are the cases that are given as examples of a decoupling really cases of decoupling? Before reverting to the conclusion that dissociations on a behavioral/phenomenological level point at dissociations on a hidden/mechanism level, we should examine the alternative that they point at different conflicting goals (one leading to approach plus liking and the other to avoidance plus disliking), and for which the end states are at different psychological distances (short-term/long-term).

Pause 15 min

12h15 > 13h

• Helene Tillbe, Ghent University

Dissociations between “wanting” and “liking” in addiction

Abstract: Incentive Sensitization Theory (IST; e.g., Robinson & Berridge, 1993) suggests that drug “wanting” (incentive salience) and not drug “liking” (the hedonic experience when one consumes drugs) plays an essential role in the development and maintenance of drug addiction. Many researchers have aimed at examining this hypothesized dissociation between “wanting” and “liking” using behavioural (implicit) measures. We will first discuss the different ways in which “wanting” and “liking” are defined within IST, and the different ways these concepts have been proceduralized. Subsequently, we will critically discuss the evidence for dissociations between “wanting” and “liking”. Furthermore, we will point out the major methodological and theoretical problems that prevent us from drawing clear conclusions regarding this topic. Finally, we will make some recommendations to advance the study of “wanting” and “liking” in the context of addiction.

Déjeuner

14h30 > 15h30

• Gabriel Robert, King College London et Université de Rennes 1

Apathy and emotional deficiencies in Parkinson disease and schizophrenia

Abstract: We propose to review the current literature about emotional disorders and their link to apathy (defined by lack of motivation) in neuropsychiatric disorders. We further propose to have a deeper insight into the relationship between apathy and emotional facial recognition within Parkinson's disease and highlight the cerebral structures involved. We also propose to use an innovative skin conductance recording (SCR) deconvolution technique to test whether apathy si related to tonic SCR activity during joy induction in schizophrenia.

15h45 > 16h45

• Jennifer Corns, Glasgow University

The causal profile of negative hedonic tone

Abstract: Negative hedonic tone is the unpleasantness that is paradigmatic of experiences like e.g. pain, grief, boredom, and nausea. This unpleasantness has often been characterized in terms of phenomena on which we have an antecedent grip. The most popularly proffered are a) homeostatic utility; b) motivational states; c) evaluations; d) desires or preferences; and e) expectations. In this talk, I argue that negative hedonic tone is only contingently, causally related to a-e and should accordingly be characterized independently. I close by further suggesting that negative hedonic tone may not only have a wide causal profile, but--against my earlier self--may be reason responsive.

17h > 18h

• Tim Schroeder, Ohio State University

Psychological Hedonism Refuted by Philosophy and Neuroscience, Working Together

Abstract: Psychological hedonism is the thesis that pleasure, or the avoidance of pain, is ultimately the only end sought by anyone, everything else being sought just as a means to these ends. Philosophers have both embraced it and rejected it since ancient times, and psychologists have been similarly ambivalent for as long as psychology has been a distinct discipline. Recently Kent Berridge has made new arguments against psychological hedonism, drawing on his work distinguishing "wanting" and "liking" systems in the brain. I argue that Berridge's arguments are not successful on their own, but that successful arguments can be made drawing upon the neuroscience that he and others have engaged in, along with some philosophical principles.

Vendredi 16 Mai 2014

8h30 > 9h30

• Stéphane Lemaire, Université de Rennes 1

Isn’t there a version of psychological hedonism that could be saved?

Abstract: The state of the art in philosophy and neurosciences seems to advocate strongly against psychological hedonism, the view according to which our desires aim at pleasure. However, if this kind of psychological hedonism is certainly false, could we not defend other weaker versions? In this presentation, I review several such possibilities and I explore the evidence available to assess the various direct and indirect links that relate motivation to pleasure. In particular, I wonder whether the experience of pleasure (or displeasure) is necessary in order to acquire new motivations and maybe in order to preserve them (or some of them). Such views may be compatible with the existence of subjects who would be motivated without having any experience of pleasure. However, this may not be a very strong argument if these lives appear devoid of any exciting goal.

9h45 > 10h45

• Serge Luquet, Université Paris-Diderot

Motivational and rewarding aspect of feeding: learning from mice models

Abstract: The reinforcing and motivational aspects of food are closely tied to the release of the neurotransmitter dopamine, which is stimulated by high-fat/high-sugar foods as well as by most other objects of desire (e.g., sex, drugs). In particular, the projection of midbrain dopamine (DA) neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to the nucleus accumbens (NAc) and other limbic brain regions is a crucial neural substrate upon which drugs of abuse (e.g., cocaine, nicotine, morphine) exert their effect; and thus this projection is often referred to as the brain ‘reward circuit’. But ‘reward’ is also the psychological process underlying reinforced behaviors. Rewards are objects or goals that produce 1) pleasure or hedonia ‘liking’ 2) approach or consummatory behavior ‘wanting’ and 3) reinforcement – the strengthening of the association between an unconditioned (primary reward, like food) and a conditioned stimulus (anything that predicts that reward, like the smell of food) that results when the two are presented together. We will discuss how experimental models using mice genetics have helped to decipher the different component of reward and the possible distinction between learning, wanting and liking.

11h > 12h

• Marc Vérin, Université de Rennes 1

To Be Announced

13h30 > 14h30

• Richard Holton, Cambridge University

What’s the good of pleasure?

Abstract: The incentive salience account of desire suggests that desire and pleasure are distinct. If that is right, what is the role of pleasure? Balleine and Dickinson have argued that it sits at the cognitive-motivational interface. I explore the ramifications of this account, and ask what it says about the implementation of self-control.

14h45 > 16h

• Didier Grandjean, Université de Genève

To Be Announced

16h : fin des travaux